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CASE DIGEST
The purpose of this Case Digest is to identify and summarize for
the reader recent cases that have less significance than those that
merit an in-depth analysis. Included in the digest are cases that
apply established legal principles without necessarily introducing
new ones.
The cases are grouped in topical categories, and references are
given for further research. It is hoped that attorneys, judges, teachers and students will find that this digest facilitates research in

problems involving current aspects of transnational law.
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ADMIRALTY

EMPLOYER is LIABLE AS A Pro Hac

Vice

OWNER FOR NEGLIGENCE OF

AN EMPLOYEE ENGAGED IN SERVICES OTHER THAN STEVEDORING

A longshoreman injured while loading a barge sued both the
barge owner and his employer for negligence under section 18(a)
of the 1972 amendments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. Although the district court found by reason of the employer's exclusive possession and control of the barge
at the time of the accident that the employer was an owner pro hac
vice, it granted a summary judgment for the employer, dismissed
the employee's negligence action, and rejected the barge owner's
claim for contribution. The court of appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the employer as a stevedore was indeed insulated from liability for negligence under subsections 905(a) and
(b), but that if the facts demonstrated that the injury arose from
negligent services connected with the barge other than stevedoring,
then the employer would be liable as a pro hac vice owner. Since
there was no change in the operative language of the exclusive

remedy provision, the court reasoned that Congress had not intended to change the Supreme Court's construction of that provision as enunciated in Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U.S. 410 (1963), which
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allowed a suit against a pro hac vice owner who was also an employer. Significance - This decision is the first to determine the
relationships between "vessel," "employer," and "owner" under
section 905(b) of the 1972 amendments to the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act for purposes of negligence liability. Griffith v. Wheeling-Pittsburg Steel Corp., 44 U.S.L.W.
2111 (3rd Cir. 1975).
SUBMERSIBLE OIL STORAGE FACILITY USED IN CONNECTION WITH OFFSHORE DRILLING Is CLASSIFIABLE AS A "VESSEL" WITHIN PROVISIONS OF

JONES ACT AND GENERAL MARITIME JURISDICTION

Crew members brought suit against oil field contractor and facility owner under the Jones Act to recover for injuries sustained
when a submersible oil storage facility tilted and refloated on its
side after an accidental removal of ballast. Plaintiffs contended,
and the court held, that the submersible oil storage facility was a
vessel. Following its decision in Cook v. Belden ConcreteProducts,
Inc., 472 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1973), the court noted that the purpose
for which a facility was constructed and the business in which it
is engaged are the controlling considerations in determining
whether or not the facility is a vessel, and that self-contained motive power is not a requirement for that finding. The court reasoned that the submersible oil storage facility should be classified
according to that test, as are submersible drilling barges and mobile drilling platforms. Significance - This case extends Jones Act
and general maritime jurisdiction to submersible oil storage facilities when the facility's purpose and present use render it a vessel.
Hicks v. Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co., 512 F.2d 817 (5th Cir.
1975).
ExCLUsIvE REMEDY PROVISION OF THE PUERTO Rico WORKMEN'S

Acci-

DENT COMPENSATION ACT DOES NOT APPLY TO A PUERTO RICAN CITIZEN INJURED OUTSIDE THE TERRITORY OF PUERTO Rico

Plaintiff seaman, a citizen of Puerto Rico, was injured aboard his
employer's vessel docked in Louisiana. He brought suit for damages against his employer under the Jones Act. The seaman's employer contended that the seaman's exclusive remedy lay under

the Puerto Rico Workmen's Accident Compensation Act. Section
21 of the Compensation Act provides that the Act is the sole remedy in suits against an employer who is covered thereby. The court
held that the plaintiff had a cause of action under the Jones Act
and under general maritime law. The court said that the exclusive
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remedy provision of the Compensation Act can override the Jones
Act only if authority to do so has been given by Congress, and
Congress had not yet given such authority. In granting the government of Puerto Rico control over the island of Puerto Rico and the
adjacent waters, Congress did not grant the power to supplant
federal maritime law outside those geographical limits.
Significance - This holding limits the application of the exclusive
remedy provision of the Puerto Rico Workmen's Accident Compensation Act to injuries occurring within the geographical limits
of Puerto Rico. Manuel Caceres v. San Juan Barge Co., 520 F.2d
305 (1st Cir. 1975).
DETERMINATION OF UNSEAWORTHINESS CAUSED BY CHARACTER OF A

PERSON ABOARD Is LIMITED TO CREW MEMBERS' CONDITION

Plaintiff brought an action for wrongful death stemming from
the axe murder of a steward aboard defendant shipowner's vessel.
Relying on Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., 348 U.S. 336
(1955), plaintiff contended that the presence of the murderer on
board rendered the ship unseaworthy. The court of appeals upheld
the lower court's decision and denied recovery, holding that failure
to establish that the attack was by a crew member, rather than by
a passenger, precluded recovery on the ground of unseaworthiness.
This decision is based on the distinction between "things about a
ship" that must be reasonably fit, and cargo, which need not. The
court reasoned that a murderous passenger was analagous to dangerous cargo, which need not be reasonably fit; therefore, plaintiff
must show that the murderer was a crew member rather than a
passenger in order to establish unseaworthiness. Significance This case establishes that the condition of passengers aboard, like
the condition of cargo, cannot render a vessel unseaworthy, even
though the condition of a crew member can. Smith v. American
Mail Line, Ltd., - F.2d __
(9th Cir. 1975).
2.

COMMON MARKET

EUROPEAN COMMUNITY DIRECTIVE REQUIRES THAT IN THE EVENT OF

THE APPOINTMENT OF A SINGLE DIRECTOR, DISCLOSURE MUST BE

MADE THAT HE REPRESENTS THE COMPANY ALONE

The Stuttgart Registrar of Companies ordered a local private
limited liability firm to state its directors' power of representation,
and to indicate, in the event only one director was appointed,
whether the sole director alone represented the company. The

212

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol 9:209

company objected in non-adversary proceedings that the required
statement was superfluous since, in view of the wording of entries
in the register and according to legislation in force, it was clear that
if only one director was appointed he alone represented the company. On appeal the Supreme Court of the Federal Republic of
Germany found that the relevant statute as amended was designed
to bring German law into line with the Council of the European
Communities First Directive of March 9, 1968. To ensure that
German law would be applied in a manner conforming to the requirements of Community law, the Supreme Court referred the
issue to the Court of Justice of the European Communities pursuant to Article 177 of the EEC Treaty. The Court of Justice held
that the Directive requires disclosure of the provisions as to representation applicable in the event of the appointment of several

directors, or, in the event of the appointment of a single director,
that he represents the company alone, even if his authority to do
so clearly flows from national law. The Court of Justice reasoned
that third parties cannot be expected to have full knowledge of the
laws or current commercial practices of other member states and
that this interpretation is necessary to facilitate obtaining essential information and to guarantee legal certainty in dealings between companies and third parties. Significance - This holding
is an outgrowth of the intensification of trade between the Member
States following the creation of the Common Market, and mandates the express statement of all relevant company information
in official registers or records regardless of whether certain
information follows automatically from national legislation or appears self-evident. In re Firma Friedrich Haaga GmbH, 2 CCH
8389 (1974).
COMM. MKT. REP.
REQUIREMENT

OF HABITUAL RESIDENCE FOR PROVIDING SERVICES

WITHIN A MEMBER STATE IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH EUROPEAN ECONOMIC

TREATY

Van Binsbergen, a resident of the Netherlands, authorized Kortmann, also a Netherlands resident, to represent him in an unemployment insurance dispute with a Netherlands trade association.
During the course of the proceedings, Kortmann transferred his
residence to Belgium and from this new residence requested that

the Centrale Raad van Beroep (court of last instance in social
security matters) forward documents in his client's file to his new
address. The registry of the court denied Kortmann's request and
cited article 48 of the law on procedure, providing that only persons
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established in the Netherlands may act as legal representatives
before the Netherlands court. Kortmann maintained that this denial was contrary to the provisions of articles 59 and 60 of the EEC,
which provide for progressive abolition of restrictions on the freedom to provide services within the Common Market. The Centrale
Raad van Beroep decided to stay the proceedings until the Court
of Justice had given an interpretation of these articles. The Court
held that legal representatives need not be permanently established within the state where the service is to be provided and that
the national law of a Member State cannot, by imposing a requirement as to habitual residence within that state, deny persons established in another Member State the right to provide services,
if the rendition of services is not subject to any special condition
under the national law. The Court reasoned that an habitual residence requirement would circumvent the Articles' specific purpose to abolish all restrictions. The Court, however, recognized
that specific professional standards may be imposed on a person
providing the service and are compatible with the EEC if they relate to organization, qualifications, professional ethics, supervision and liability, and are consistently applied to all persons, as
long as the person providing the service would escape those rules
by being established in another Member State. Significance The case abolishes all discriminatory restrictions on services
within the Common Market, except when requirements for professional service are intended to bring about equality of treatment
between the nationals of one Member State and the nationals of
the other states of the Common Market. Van Binsbergen v. Bestuur, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8282 (1974).
3.

JURISDICTION

SERVICE OF PROCESS ON FOREIGN GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES MAY BE
EFFECTUATED UNDER F.R.C.P. RULE 83

Plaintiff-appellee was the assignee of construction contracts to
build roads in Uruguay for the defendant-appellant, Ministry of
Public Works. Plaintiff brought a breach of contract action in a
California federal district court, in which the defendant challenged
the service of process, moved for dismissal, and filed a document
of withdrawal. A default judgment was entered. The appellant
contended that service was inadequate, that the court lacked personal jurisdiction, and that the choice of a Uruguayan forum clause
in the contract precluded American disposition of the case. The
court held that the choice of forum clause controlled, following The
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Breman v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1972). In dicta, the
court stated that service upon a foreign governmental agency could
be achieved by procedure fashioned by a district judge under
F.R.C.P. Rule 83 if "reasonably calculated to give actual notice."
Significance - The standard for adequate notice to a foreign governmental agency is F.R.C.P. Rule 83. Republic International
Corp. v. Amco Engineers, Inc., 516 F.2d 161 (9th Cir. 1975).
EXTRATERRITORIAL SECURITIES VIOLATIONS REQUIRE SIGNIFICANT

Di-

RECT IMPACT ON UNITED STATES TO WARRANT SUBJECT MATTER

JURISDICTION

Through a finance and development organization, the Canadian
provincial government of Manitoba contracted with a Canadian
corporation, which was completely, and allegedly covertly, owned
by a United States citizen, to purchase, develop, and operate a
forestry complex in exchange for timber concessions. Alleging
fraud, the S.E.C. based jurisdiction on stateside acts, which included negotiation meetings, transfers of funds, domestic incorporation of involved parties, and use of interstate commerce. The
defendants contended that the transactions were essentially foreign and without significant impact on the United States, and that
by conferring jurisdiction, the court would ignore the manifest
intent of Congress. The court examined the intent of Congress
shown in the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and held that the domestic impact was not direct and
significant enough to warrant implementation of subject matter
jurisdiction. The denial was based on findings that the investment
was made by a single Canadian entity, that the securities were
neither traded on the American market nor exposed to American
investors, and that all but one of the contracts were executed
extraterritorially. Significance - This decision articulates a general discretionary reluctance on the part of the court to find subject
matter jurisdiction in the absence of a clear statement of legislative intent by the Congress. Securities and Exchange Commission
v. Kasser, 391 F. Supp. 1167 (1975).
4.

LAW OF THE SEA

LOWER COOK INLET IS NOT AN HISTORIC BAY AND CONSEQUENTLY

TITLE TO SUBMERGED LANDS IN THE AREA IS IN THE UNITED STATES,
NOT ALASKA

The State of Alaska offered submerged lands in lower Cook In-
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let for oil and gas leases. The United States, contending it had
rights to the lower inlet superior to Alaska's because the lower inlet

constituted high seas, brought suit to quiet title and for injunctive
relief. Overruling the ninth circuit, the Supreme Court held that
lower Cook Inlet was neither an historic bay nor under the jurisdiction of Alaska because the evidence proffered was insufficient to
show that Alaska traditionally asserted and maintained dominion
over the lower inlet with the acquiescence of foreign nations.
Significance - This case decides the question, important to energy
companies as well as the governments involved, of whether lower
Cook Inlet is an historic bay and which government shall control
the lands submerged below it. United States v. Alaska, 95 S.Ct.
2240 (1975).
5. SHIPPING
CARGO CONSIGNEE LIABLE FOR CONTRIBUTION TO CARRIER WHERE DE
FACTO JASON CLAUSE FOUND IN VOYAGE CHARTER

Plaintiff carrier's negligence caused the Captayannis "S" to run
aground, leaving the cargo intact but rendering the ship a constructive total loss. Carrier sought to compel contribution in general average from defendant cargo consignee on the basis of the
voyage charter. Defendant contended that it was not liable for
contribution in general average in the absence of a Jason Clause
in the bills of lading. The court recognized that bills of lading
normally constitute a complete statement of the contract of carriage, but nevertheless held the defendant liable for contribution.
The holding was based on a finding that the voyage charter contained a de facto Jason Clause of which defendant had notice, and
upon the privity of defendant to the entire contract of carriage
including the voyage charter. Significance - This holding extends

the liability of a cargo consignee to the shipper for contribution in
general average when the consignee has notice of a Jason Clause
set forth in a voyage charter to which the consignee was privy.
Sarantex Shipping Co. v. Wilbur-Ellis Co., 391 F. Supp. 884 (D.

Ore. 1975).
6. TAXATION
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE SECTION

911(a)(1)

PERMrrs THE EXCLUSION

OF INCOME EARNED ABROAD IF THE TAXPAYER IS A BONA FIDE FOREIGN
RESIDENT FOR THE PERIOD FOR WHICH THE

RETURN

Is MADE

Taxpayer, a United States citizen, was a resident in Argentina
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from shortly before January 1 until his death on June 25 of the
same year. An income tax return was filed on his behalf for the

period January 1 to June 25. The income earned in Argentina by
the taxpayer was excluded pursuant to Internal Revenue Code §
911(a)(1), which exempts from taxation income earned abroad by
a citizen who is a bona fide resident of a foreign country for an
entire taxable year. The Commissioner contended that this exclusion was impermissible because the taxpayer had not been a foreign resident for an entire taxable year, which the Commissioner
defined as a minimum 12 month period that includes a full taxable
year. The court held that the phrase "taxable year" is a term of
art meaning the period for which a return is made. This definition
is given in other contexts in sections 441(b)(3) and 7701(a)(23).
The court reasoned that Congress must be presumed to have intended the phrase to have a single meaning throughout the Code,
absent any indication to the contrary. Significance-This holding
establishes the meaning of "taxable year" in the foreign income
exclusion provision of section 911(a)(1). Roodner v. Commissioner,
44 U.S.L.W. 2067 (T.C. 1975).

